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Abstract. What computational principles underlie hu-
man pragmatic reasoning? A prominent approach to
pragmatics is the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework,
which formulates pragmatic reasoning as probabilistic
speakers and listeners recursively reasoning about each
other. While RSA enjoys broad empirical support, it is
not yet clear whether the dynamics of such recursive rea-
soning may be governed by a general optimization princi-
ple. Here, we present a novel analysis of the RSA frame-
work that addresses this question. First, we show that
RSA recursion implements an alternating maximization
for optimizing a tradeoff between expected utility and
communicative effort. On that basis, we study the dy-
namics of RSA recursion and disconfirm the conjecture
that expected utility is guaranteed to improve with recur-
sion depth. Second, we show that RSA can be grounded
in Rate–Distortion theory, while maintaining a similar
ability to account for human behavior and avoiding a bias
of RSA toward random utterance production. This work
furthers the mathematical understanding of RSA mod-
els, and suggests that general information-theoretic prin-
ciples may give rise to human pragmatic reasoning.
1 Introduction
The ability to reason about meaning in the local context of so-
cial interactions is a fundamental aspect of human language.
For example, pragmatic reasoning is key to inferring non-
literal meanings of utterances, efficient use of linguistic ambi-
guity (Peloquin, Goodman, & Frank, 2019), and driving lan-
guage evolution and change (Sperber & Origgi, 2010; Trau-
gott, 2012). Thus, understanding the computational princi-
ples that may give rise to pragmatic reasoning is important
for studying the forces that shape language and cognition.
A prominent computational approach to pragmatics is the
Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework (Frank & Goodman,
2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016). RSA formulates prag-
matic reasoning as probabilistic speakers and listeners recur-
sively reasoning about each other’s state of mind with the
goal of cooperatively gaining communicative utility. This
framework enjoys broad empirical support across a num-
ber of psycholinguistic phenomena, such as scalar implica-
ture, irony, metaphor, and hyperbole (for review: Goodman
& Frank, 2016). In many cases, RSA’s recursive reasoning
is assumed to terminate after one or two iterations, although
several studies have explored and motivated deeper recur-
sions (e.g., Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004; Franke & Degen,
2016; Bergen, Levy, & Goodman, 2016; Levy, 2018; Frank,
Emilsson, Peloquin, Goodman, & Potts, 2018). However,
much remains unknown about the dynamics of RSA recur-
sion and whether it can be characterized by a well-motivated
optimization principle. It has been conjectured that RSA dy-
namics is guaranteed to increase expected utility (e.g., Yuan,
Monroe, Bai, & Kushman, 2018; Peloquin et al., 2019), but
these explorations have relied on numeric simulations, leav-
ing open key questions about the dynamics of RSA models.
In this work we present a set of analytic results, demon-
strated by model simulations, that extend the theoretical un-
derstanding of the RSA framework and ground it in Rate–
Distortion (RD) theory (Shannon, 1948) — the subfield of in-
formation theory that characterizes efficient compression un-
der limited resources, and has recently been applied to other
aspects of language (Zaslavsky, Kemp, Regier, & Tishby,
2018; Hahn, Jurafsky, & Futrell, 2020) and cognition (Sims,
2016, 2018; Gershman, 2020). Specifically, our main contri-
butions are: (1) We show that RSA recursion is an instance of
the alternating maximization algorithm (Csisza´r & Shields,
2004). However, this optimization does not maximize ex-
pected utility as previously conjectured, but rather a tradeoff
between expected utility and communicative effort. (2) We
show that the RSA tradeoff can be generalized to a type of RD
tradeoff, which yields a slightly modified model of pragmatic
reasoning. We refer to this model as RD-RSA. (3) Building
on these results, we study the dynamics of RSA and RD-RSA
and compare their predictions. We find that RD-RSA is simi-
lar to RSA in its ability to account for human behavior, while
avoiding a bias of RSA toward non-informative random ut-
terance production. Taken together, these results suggest that
human pragmatic reasoning may be understood in terms of
RD theory.
The Rational Speech Act framework
We begin by reviewing the formal setup of the RSA frame-
work, which forms the basis for our analysis. The RSA
framework provides a class of models of pragmatic reasoning,
based on a reference game involving a speaker and a listener.
The game is defined by a set of meanings (referents)M, a set
of utterances U , and a lexicon l(m,u) that determines the lit-
eral meanings of each utterance (see Figure 1a for example).
Given a meaning m ∈ M drawn from a prior distribution
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(a)
M GM HG
mustache 1 1 0
glasses 0 1 1
hat 0 0 1
(b)
L0
S1
L1
L2
S2
S3
. . .
Figure 1. (a) Example lexicon with meanings (columns) and ut-
terances (rows) adapted from Vogel et al. (2014). Upon hearing
glasses, a pragmatic listener must make a multi-step inference to
select GM: while both GM and HG have another possible descrip-
tor, hat could have unambiguously identified HG, whereas mustache
ambiguously refers to both M and GM. (b) Illustration of the dy-
namics of RSA recursion. The literal listener L0 is initialized from
the lexicon. Black arrows correspond to agent updates. Blue ovals
highlight (Lt, St+1) agent pairs, and orange ovals highlight (St, Lt)
agent pairs.
P (m), the speaker communicatesm to the listener by produc-
ing an utterance u ∈ U according to a production distribution
S(u|m). Upon hearing this utterance, the listener interprets
it according to an inference distribution L(m|u). RSA recur-
sively relates the speaker and listener by assuming that the
speaker rationalizes about the listener’s inferences, and that
the listener is Bayesian with respect to the speaker’s distribu-
tion. This recursion is typically initialized with a literal lis-
tenerL0 that makes inferences based on the literal meaning of
utterances; that is, L0(m|u) ∝ l(m,u)P (m). The pragmatic
speaker is bounded-rational with respect to a utility function
VL(m,u), typically defined by
VL(m,u) = logL(m|u)− C(u) , (1)
where C(u) ≥ 0 specifies the cost of u. The speaker and
listener at recursion depth t ≥ 1 are defined by
St(u|m) ∝ eαVt−1(u,m) (2)
Lt(m|u) ∝ St(u|m)P (m) , (3)
where Vt−1 is simplified notation for VLt−1 , and α ≥ 0 con-
trols the degree to which the speaker is rational with respect
to maximizing utility. The dynamics of this recursive pro-
cess are illustrated in Figure 1b. We denote by S∗ and L∗ the
speaker’s and listener’s distributions at the limit t→∞.
2 Understanding RSA dynamics as
Alternating–Maximization
Our first theoretical result is that the RSA recursion optimizes
a tradeoff between maximizing expected utility,
ES [VL] =
∑
m,u
P (m)S(u|m)VL(m,u) , (4)
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Figure 2. Model simulations demonstrate that RSA recursion im-
plements an alternating maximization algorithm. This example is
based on the same model of Figure 3 (α = 1.2). The RSA trade-
off Gα improves with each speaker update (blue) and each listener
update (orange).
and maximizing the conditional entropy of the speaker’s pro-
duction distribution,
HS(U |M) = −
∑
m,u
P (m)S(u|m) logS(u|m) . (5)
More precisely, we show that for any α ≥ 0, RSA’s pragmatic
interlocutors jointly maximize
Gα[S,L] = HS(U |M) + αES [VL] . (6)
In this view, α does not trade off against recursion depth, as
is widely understood (Frank et al., 2018). Rather, the value
of α determines the tradeoff between one conception of com-
municative effort, HS(U |M), and expected utility that is op-
timized by RSA recursion.
Importantly, this result holds without assuming that S and
L satisfy equations (2) and (3) respectively. Instead, the opti-
mization is taken over all valid speaker and listener distribu-
tions, and the RSA equations emerge as characterizing the
optimal agents. The main idea of the proof is to take the
derivatives of Gα with respect to S and L, and equate these
derivatives to zero to obtain conditions for optimality. The
formal statement and proof of this claim are given in the Sup-
plementary Material (SM, Proposition 1). Here, we discuss
the implications of this result and demonstrate it numerically.
First, optimizing Gα can be interpreted as a type of least-
effort principle (Zipf, 1949). Maximizing ES [VL] amounts
to minimizing the expected listener’s surprisal and the cost
of utterances. Maximizing HS(U |M) amounts to minimiz-
ing communicative effort, measured by the deviation from a
random production of utterances. These two terms compete:
attaining the maximal expected utility requires a very precise
selection of utterances, leading to low entropy (high effort),
while attaining minimal communicative effort requires a ran-
dom production distribution, leading to low expected utility.
Therefore, least-effort optimization may give rise to human
pragmatic reasoning as captured by RSA.
Second, Proposition 1 in the SM implies that the RSA re-
cursion implements an instance of the alternating maximiza-
tion algorithm (Csisza´r & Shields, 2004). That is, given a
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Figure 3. Model simulations demonstrating qualitatively different behavior as a function α. See text for details. (a) The RSA tradeoff Gα is
monotonically non-decreasing with recursion depth. (b) Expected utility as a function of the speaker’s entropy, HS(U |M). The initialization
ofL0 is the same for both values of α; however, the initial points do not overlap because they correspond to (L0, S1). (c) Listener distributions
at initial and converged conditions for α = 0.9 (red) and α = 1.2 (blue). Matrix rows correspond to speaker utterances and columns to
inferred meanings. Darker grays correspond to higher probabilities.
listener Lt−1 it holds that
St = argmax
S
Gα[S,Lt−1] , (7)
and given a speaker St it holds that
Lt = argmax
L
Gα[St, L] . (8)
In particular, this means that Gα is monotonically non-
decreasing with recursion depth. That is, for every t ≥ 1
Gα[St, Lt−1] ≤ Gα[St, Lt] ≤ Gα[St+1, Lt] . (9)
This process is demonstrated by the model simulation of Fig-
ure 2. Because Gα is bounded from above, it follows that RSA
iterations are guaranteed to converge,1 and the fixed points of
this recursion are stationary points of Gα.
This result disconfirms a known conjecture about RSA dy-
namics. Because the RSA speaker is guided by (soft) opti-
mization of utterance utility, the intuition is widely held that
RSA recursion locally maximizes expected utility (e.g., Yuan
et al., 2018; Peloquin et al., 2019). However, our analysis
reveals that RSA recursion optimizes Gα, and this does not
imply that the expected utility is maximized. In fact, it is pos-
sible to show that the listener maximizes the expected utility,
but not the speaker. Intuitively, this holds because HS(U |M)
depends only on S, and therefore in practice the listener’s up-
date step (8) maximizes only the expected utility, whereas the
speaker’s update step (7) trades it off with communicative ef-
fort, which may result in lower expected utility. To see this
more formally, fix St and note that
ESt [Vt] =
1
α
(Gα[St, Lt]−HSt(U |M)) (10)
= 1
α
(max
L
Gα[St, L]−HSt(U |M)) (11)
= max
L
ESt [VL] , (12)
1To be precise, this implies that the value of Gα is guaranteed to con-
verge to a local optimum. For stronger convergence conditions see (Csisza´r
& Tusna´dy, 1984).
which implies in particular that ESt [Vt] ≥ ESt [Vt−1] at ev-
ery recursion depth t. However, the expected utility may de-
crease due to the speaker update step, that is, it is possible
that ESt [Vt] < ESt−1 [Vt−1].
This observation is exemplified in Figure 3. To this end,
we considered a standard RSA model with three uniformly
distributed meanings and three possible utterances. The lexi-
con in this example is a graded2 version of the lexicon shown
in Figure 1a, as can be seen by the structure of the literal lis-
tener (Figure 3c,L0). For simplicity, we takeC(u) = 0. Con-
sistent with our theoretical analysis, RSA iterations always
improve Gα (Figure 3a), but expected utility may increase
(Figure 3b, blue trajectory), or decrease (red trajectory), de-
pending on α. Our analysis also implies that in cases where
the initial state (L0, S1) has maximal HS(U |M) given hard
lexical constraints (i.e., structural zeros in the lexicon arising
when some messages do not satisfy the truth conditions of
some utterances), the expected utility will not decrease. We
speculate that the possibility of RSA iteration decreasing ex-
pected utility has not previously been identified in numeric
simulations because RSA initializations are typically already
high in speaker conditional entropy.
In the following sections, we build on this new inter-
pretation of RSA in order to ground it in a fundamental
information-theoretic principle, and to study analytically sev-
eral properties of these models, including the influence of α
and the asymptotic behavior of their dynamics.
3 Grounding RSA in Rate–Distortion
theory
Returning to the general communication setup of RSA, the
speaker can be seen as a probabilistic encoder and the listener
as a probabilistic decoder. From an information-theoretic per-
2While the lexicon is often taken to be binary, graded lexica have also
been notably considered (e.g., Yuan et al., 2018).
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spective, optimal encoder-decoder pairs in this setup are char-
acterized by Rate–Distortion (RD) theory (Shannon, 1948)
— the subfield of information-theory that concerns efficient
source coding with respect to a fitness function (or distortion)
between a target message (speaker’s meaning) and a recon-
structed message (listener’s interpretation). In this view, the
speaker and listener should jointly optimize the tradeoff be-
tween maximizing the expected utility and minimizing the
number of bits required for communication. The latter is cap-
tured by minimizing the mutual information between speaker
meanings and utterances
IS(M ;U) = HS(U)−HS(U |M) , (13)
where HS(U) is the entropy of the marginal distribution of
speaker utterances S(u) =
∑
m P (m)S(u|m). In other
words, from a RD perspective, the speaker and listener should
jointly minimize the tradeoff
Fα[S,L] = IS(M ;U)− αES [VL] . (14)
This type of RD tradeoff is closely related to the RSA trade-
off. This can be seen by plugging equations (13) and (6)
into (14), which gives
Fα[S,L] = HS(U)− Gα[S,L] . (15)
We therefore refer to the optimization of Fα as RD-RSA.
The key difference between RSA and RD-RSA is the utter-
ance entropy term HS(U). RSA optimization, i.e., maximiz-
ing Gα, is equivalent to minimizingFα[S,L]while also maxi-
mizingHS(U). MinimizingFα[S,L] alone yields a modified
model of pragmatic reasoning. Following a similar deriva-
tion as the derivation of RSA as alternating–maximization,
we show that RD-RSA predicts the following recursive rea-
soning process (SM, Proposition 2):
St(u|m) ∝ St−1(u) exp (αVt−1(m,u)) (16)
St(u) =
∑
m
St(u|m)P (m) (17)
Lt(m|u) ∝ St(u|m)P (m) . (18)
These update equations also implement an alternating opti-
mization algorithm, this time with respect toFα. The optimal
RD-RSA listener is Bayesian (18), exactly as in RSA. How-
ever, the optimal pragmatic speaker (16) differs from the RSA
speaker (2) in that it weights the soft-max utility term by the
marginal utterance probability S(u). One might be inclined
to think that this adjustment is simply a special instance of
RSA with cost function C(u) = − logS(u). We wish to em-
phasize that this is not the case. S(u) is not pre-determined,
as a cost function would be in RSA, but rather changes with
each iteration as the speaker reasons about the listener.
This analysis shows that with a small adjustment, RSA can
be grounded in RD theory. While RD-RSA is closely related
to RSA, the theoretical motivation and precise predictions of
these two principles are different. Next, we compare several
properties of RSA and RD-RSA in order to gain insight into
which principle might better characterize human pragmatic
reasoning.
4 Properties of RSA and RD-RSA
Building on the results presented above, we study the asymp-
totic tendencies of RSA and RD-RSA and evaluate their pre-
dictions on existing experimental data.
Asymptotic behavior and criticality of α = 1
To gain a better understanding of the dynamics of RSA and
RD-RSA recursion, we analyze their asymptotic behavior.
That is, we focus on the set of optimal pairs (S∗, L∗) as
a function of α. For RSA, these are the fixed points of
equations (7) and (8) (or equivalently, (2) and (3)), and for
RD-RSA these are the fixed points of equations (16)-(18).
This reveals the general tendencies of the model dynamics,
and shows how the value of α may influence the model pre-
dictions. Therefore, this asymptotic analysis is useful even
if human pragmatic reasoning, to the extent that it resembles
this recursive process, might be confined to a small number
of iterations. As before, the formal proofs are provided in
the SM (Section 3), and here we discuss these results while
focusing on the main conclusions.
We begin by considering a basic RSA setup in which the
speaker’s meanings are distributed uniformly, C(u) = 0, and
the number of unique utterances is the same as the number
of meanings. In addition, we first assume a graded lexicon
l(m,u) ∈ (0, 1], where the values defining the applicabil-
ity of utterances to meanings can be arbitrarily small but not
zero. We prove in the SM that in both RSA and RD-RSA,
α = 1 is a critical point at which the optimization dynam-
ics changes its direction. That is, there are two regimes:
α ∈ [0, 1], in which the non-informative solution (i.e., max-
imal HS(U |M) in RSA, and IS(M ;U) = 0 in RD-RSA)
is optimal; and α ≥ 1, in which the maximal-utility so-
lution (i.e., ES [VL] = 0) is optimal. This transition can be
clearly seen for RSA in Figure 3b, and similar simulations of
RD-RSA exhibit the same behavior (not shown). Our anal-
ysis in the SM also shows that RSA and RD-RSA differ at
α = 1. At this point, in RD-RSA, but not in RSA, all fixed
points are globally optimal.
Next, we consider the same basic setup but allow structural
zeros in the lexicon. In this case, if there exists a maximal-
utility solution (e.g., a bijection from meanings to utterances)
that does not violate the lexicon, which is often the case, then
it remains a global optimum for α ≥ 1, as in the case of
a graded lexicon. On the other hand, the non-informative
solution typically violates the lexicon, leading to a different
behavior in the regime of α < 1. We demonstrate this by
the model simulations shown in Figure 4 (top), using the bi-
nary lexicon of Figure 1a. As expected, for α > 1 both RSA
and RD-RSA converge to the maximal-utility point (blue and
green trajectories), and for α = 1 RD-RSA converges imme-
diately, while RSA still converges to the maximal-utility point
(purple trajectories). For α < 1, the models cannot reach the
non-informative solution because it violates the lexicon (red
trajectories). In this case, RD-RSA’s trajectory moves toward
the non-informative solution but converges at a solution with
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Figure 4. Model simulations and evaluation with respect to the data
from Vogel et al. (2014). Top: Simulated model trajectories from L0
to L∗ in RSA (left) and RD-RSA (right). Bottom: Pearson correla-
tion ρ between model predictions and human behavioral results as a
function of recursion depth. Horizontal dashed line corresponds to
the literal listener L0.
I(M ;U) > 0. RSA’s trajectory moves in the other direction,
but importantly it converges at a solution with lower expected
utility compared to those of α ≥ 1.
Finally, we note that considering a non-trivial costC(u), or
a two-positional cost C(m,u), may change substantially the
dynamics of the models. We present in the SM a preliminary
analysis of the influence of the cost function on the behavior
of the models, and leave to future work a more comprehensive
analysis of this case.
Comparison with human behavior
We have seen thus far that even though RD-RSA is closely
related to RSA, it may generate different predictions. This
raises the question how well can RD-RSA account for hu-
man behavior compared to RSA. To address this, we consider
data from an online reference game experiment conducted by
Vogel et al. (2014). Each trial presents a set of target objects
and a set of possible speaker utterances3 that conform to the
lexicon shown in Figure 1a. Participants were then given a
speaker utterance, and were asked to indicate which of the
target objects they think the speaker refers to. As explained
in Figure 1, this experimental setup invites a complex pat-
tern of pragmatic reasoning. We estimated an empirical hu-
man listener from the responses recorded by Vogel et al., and
3Several different stimulus types were presented during the experiment,
but the structure of the lexicon was consistent across trials. Note that we only
consider data from the Complex condition.
compared that to the pragmatic listeners predicted by RSA
and RD-RSA with the lexicon of Figure 1a. Following Frank
et al. (2018), who have previously presented an RSA account
of these data, we assume a uniform prior over meanings and
no utterance cost. This setting corresponds to the model sim-
ulations of Figure 4 (top), discussed earlier. Figure 4 (bottom)
shows the correlation between the model predictions and the
behavioral data as a function of recursion depth. It can be
seen that the predictions of both RSA and RD-RSA improve
in the first few iterations, and then deteriorate with depth (ex-
cept for α = 1 in RD-RSA, which converges immediately).
This is consistent with prior work on RSA (e.g., Frank et al.,
2018). While the value ofα and depth that best fit the data dif-
fer between RSA (α = 0.9, depth 1) and RD-RSA (α = 1.2,
depth 5), their correlation is similar (RSA: ρ = 0.98, RD-
RSA: ρ = 0.97), and so are their predicted listeners (see SM
Section 4). Therefore, RD-RSA is comparable to RSA in its
ability to account for human behavior in this task.
Conditional entropy or mutual information?
Last, we demonstrate an important implication of the key
difference between RSA and RD-RSA, that is, maximizing
HS(U |M) rather than minimizing IS(M ;U). As noted be-
fore, this difference boils down to RSA maximizing HS(U)
while also optimizing the RD-RSA objective. This implies
that the RSA speaker, as opposed to the RD-RSA speaker,
is biased toward random utterance productions. To demon-
strate this, we ran similar simulations as in Figure 4, but now
with an extra utterance that can be applied to all meanings
(e.g., friend). Figure 5 shows the optimal speakers in this
case for two values of α. For α = 0.5 there is strong pres-
sure to minimize communicative effort. In this case, the RSA
speaker uses all utterances almost uniformly, which does not
convey much information to the listener, while the RD-RSA
speaker follows an intuitively simpler production distribution
h g m f h g m f
Figure 5. Optimal speaker distributions for α = 0.5 (top) and
α = 3 (bottom). Here, we augmented the lexicon of Figure 1a with
an extra utterance that can be applied to all referents (e.g. friend, la-
beled as ‘f’). RSA predicts a bias toward randomized productions,
while RD-RSA does not.
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that exclusively uses the extra utterance. For α = 3 there is
strong pressure to maximize expected utility. In this case, the
RSA speaker uses the extra utterance to randomize the de-
scription of one referent, because this increases entropy with-
out changing the expected utility. In RD-RSA this speaker is
also optimal, but so is the speaker that uses a single unique
utterance for each referent (shown in the bottom right of Fig-
ure 5). Therefore, RD-RSA does not predict a cognitive bias
toward randomness.
5 Discussion
Pragmatic reasoning is a crucial aspect of human language,
often understood within the Rational Speech Act (RSA)
framework. While this framework has been remarkably suc-
cessful in explaining a wide range of psycholinguisic phe-
nomena, it has not been cast in terms of a general optimiza-
tion principle, leaving open the question of whether such a
principle exists for characterizing human pragmatic behavior.
Here, we have addressed this open question by presenting a
novel information-theoretic analysis of the RSA framework.
We have shown that RSA’s recursive reasoning can be derived
from least-effort optimization, in contrast to a widely held
view of RSA as implementing a heuristic process for maxi-
mizing utility. Furthermore, we have shown that with a small
adjustment, RSA can be grounded in a more fundamental op-
timization principle, RD-RSA, which is based on Shannon’s
Rate–Distortion (RD) theory.
We believe that RD-RSA is particularly noteworthy for
several reasons. First, as our results suggest, RD-RSA
avoids RSA’s bias toward non-informative random produc-
tions, while maintaining similar ability to account for hu-
man behavior. Our analysis has been based only on data
from Vogel et al. (2014), and so an important direction for
future work is to further test the predictions of RD-RSA on
additional experimental data.
Second, RD-RSA not only suggests a general information-
theoretic principle that may give rise to human pragmatic rea-
soning, but also provides a potential theoretical link between
pragmatics and several other aspects of language (Zaslavsky
et al., 2018; Hahn et al., 2020) and cognition (Sims, 2016,
2018; Gershman, 2020) to which RD theory has recently been
applied successfully. We also note that RSA’s optimization
principle (6) suggests interesting theoretical links to other re-
lated frameworks, such as the recent Optimal Transport ap-
proach to cooperative communication (Wang, Wang, Parana-
mana, & Shafto, 2019), although the latter applies only to a
single iteration of pragmatic reasoning in the RSA framework
(but see Yuan et al., 2018, for the special case of α = 1).
Finally, we argue that RD-RSA addresses a major concern
about the applicability of information theory to pragmatics.
As noted by Sperber and Wilson: “there is a gap between
the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts
actually communicated by utterances. This gap is filled not
by more coding, but by inference” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986,
p. 9). RD theory lies at the intersection of information theory
and statistical inference, and thus it may capture both aspects
of coding and inference in pragmatics, and perhaps in lan-
guage more generally.
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Supplementary Material
A Rate–Distortion view of human pragmatic reasoning
1 Understanding RSA dynamics as Alternating Maximization
Here we prove that RSA recursion implements an alternating maximization algorithm for optimizing
Gα[S, L] = HS(U |M) + αES [VL] . (19)
Before doing so, we introduce several required definitions and notations. First, we formally define an RSA
reference game by a tuple < M,U , P (m), l, C >, whereM is a finite set of meanings (referents), U is a
finite set of utterances, P (m) is a prior distribution over M, l is a lexicon, and C is a cost function. We
formally define a lexicon by a mapping l : M× U → [0, 1], such that l(m,u) > 0 if u can be applied to
m and l(m,u) = 0 otherwise. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that C : U → R+, namely that C is a
non-negative utterance cost function. More generally, C could also be a two-positional cost function, i.e.,
C :M×U → R+ . Next, we define the set of all speaker and listener distributions that do not violate a given
lexicon l. Denote by 4(U) the simplex of probability distributions over U , and by 4(U)M the set of all
conditional probability distributions of U given M . Similarly, denote by 4(M)U the set of all conditional
probability distributions of M given U . The set of all possible speakers that do not violate the lexicon is
then
Sl = {S ∈ 4(U)M : S(u|m) = 0 if l(m,u) = 0} , (20)
and the set of all possible listeners that do not violate the lexicon is
Ll = {L ∈ 4(M)U : L(m|u) = 0 if l(m,u) = 0} . (21)
It is easy to verify that S and L are convex sets.
Proposition 1 (RSA optimization). Let α ≥ 0. The following statements hold for RSA:
• RSA recursion implements an alternating maximization: for all t ≥ 1, for a fixed Lt−1 it holds that
St = argmax
S∈4(U)M
Gα[S, Lt−1] , (22)
and for a fixed St it holds that
Lt = argmax
L∈4(M)U
Gα[St, L] , (23)
where St and Lt are RSA’s speaker and listener distributions at recursion depth t.
• If Lt−1 ∈ Ll then St ∈ Sl, and if St ∈ Sl then Lt ∈ Ll. That is, RSA iterations do not violate the hard
lexicon constraints.
• The fixed points of the RSA recursion are stationary points of Gα.
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Proof. First, fix Lt−1 and note that the function g(S) = Gα[S, Lt−1] is concave in S. To find a maximizer
for g(S) over4(U)M we define the Lagrangian
L[S;λ] = g(S)−
∑
m
λ(m)
∑
u
S(u|m) ,
where λ(m) are the normalization Lagrange multipliers.1 Note that if for some m and u it holds that
Lt−1(m|u) = 0 and S(u|m) > 0, then g(S) = −∞. Therefore, at the maximum, it necessarily holds that if
Lt−1(m|u) = 0 then also S(m|u) = 0 (following the convention that 0 log 0 = 0). In particular, this implies
that if Lt−1 ∈ Ll then argmax g(S) ∈ Sl. That is, if Lt−1 does not violate the lexicon, then maximizing
g(S) is guaranteed to give a speaker that also does not violate the lexicon. Taking the derivative of L[S;λ]
with respect to S(u|m), for every m and u such that Lt−1(m|u) > 0, gives
∂L
∂S(u|m) = P (m) [− logS(u|m)− 1 + αVt−1(m,u)]− λ(m) .
Equating these derivatives to zero gives RSA’s speaker St (equation (2) in the main text), as a necessary
condition for optimality. Because g(S) is concave, this is also a sufficient condition for this step.
Next, fix St and consider the function h(L) = Gα[St, L]. This function is concave in L. To find a
maximizer for h over 4(M)U , we define as before the corresponding Lagrangian and take its derivative
with respect to L(m|u). This gives
∂L
∂L(m|u) = αP (m)St(u|m)
1
L(m|u) − λ(u) .
Equating this derivative to zero gives RSA’s Bayesian listener Lt (equation (3) in the main text) as a neces-
sary condition for optimality. Because h(L) is concave, this is also a sufficient condition for this step. It is
also easy to verify that if St(u|m) = 0 then Lt(m|u) = 0, and therefore if St ∈ Sl then Lt ∈ Ll.
Finally, at a fixed point (S∗, L∗) both the derivatives with respect to S and to L are zero. Because these are
also the derivatives of Gα over4(U)M×4(M)U , it holds that (S∗, L∗) is a stationary point of Gα. Note that
Gα is not jointly concave in S and in L, and therefore, (S∗, L∗) is not necessarily a global maximum.
2 Derivation of RD-RSA
In this section we derive the RD-RSA update equations from the minimization of
Fα[S, L] = IS(M ;U)− αES [VL] . (24)
This can be seen as a type of Rate–Distortion (RD) optimization problem with a variable distortion measure
d(m,u) = −VL(m,u) between meanings and utterances.
Proposition 2 (RD-RSA). Let S ∈ 4(U)M and L ∈ 4(M)U . Given α > 0, S and L are stationary points
of Fα if and only if they satisfy the following self-consistent conditions:
S(u|m) ∝ S(u) exp (αVL(m,u)) (25)
S(u) =
∑
m
S(u|m)P (m) (26)
L(m|u) = S(u|m)P (m)
S(u) (27)
1We omit the non-negativity constraints because these constraints are inactive.
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Proof. The main idea of the proof is to take the derivatives of Fα w.r.t. S(u|m), S(u), and L(m|u), and
equate these derivatives to zero, which gives the RD-RSA equations (25)-(27) as necessary conditions for
optimality. This derivation is similar to the derivation in the proof of Proposition 1, and therefore we do not
repeat it here.
Note that Fα is convex in S(u|m), S(u), and L(m|u), although it is not jointly convex in these three
distributions. Therefore, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, it holds that Fα can be optimized via an
alternating minimization algorithm that iteratively updates equations (25)-(27), as described in the main text.
However, because Fα is not jointly convex in these variables, this iterative algorithm will not necessarily
converge to a global optimum.
3 Asymptotic behavior and the criticality of α = 1
In this section we analyze the asymptotic behavior of RSA and RD-RSA dynamics. In both cases, we focus
mainly on the basic RSA setup discussed in the main text. We also present preliminary analysis of the
influence of the cost function.
3.1 RSA
Denote by G∗α the maximal value of Gα given α, and let S∗α and L∗α be optimal speaker and listener distribu-
tions that attain G∗α. That is, G∗α = Gα[S∗α, L∗α]. The following proposition characterizes G∗α, S∗α, and L∗α, as
a function of α, in a basic RSA setup.
Proposition 3 (Asymptotic behavior of RSA). Let C(u) be a constant function, P (m) be the uniform dis-
tribution overM, and assume K = |M| = |U|. In addition, assume a graded lexicon l with no structural
zeros. Then the following statements hold:
1. G∗α = max{(1− α) logK, 0}
2. For α ∈ [0, 1], S∗α(u|m) = 1|U| and L∗α(m|u) = P (m).
3. For α ≥ 1, S∗α and L∗α are deterministic distributions defined by a bijection fromM to U .
Proof. We prove these claims by first deriving an upper bound on Gα and then showing that the given S∗α
and L∗α attain this bound in the two regimes of α. Assume w.l.o.g. that C(u) = 0, and let S(m|u) be the
posterior distribution with respect to S(u|m) and P (m). For any S and L it holds that
Gα[S, L] ≤ HS(U |M) + αES [logS(m|u)] (28)
= HS(U |M) + αES
[
log S(u|m)P (m)
S(u)
]
(29)
= (α− 1)IS(M ;U) +HS(U)− αH(M) . (30)
Equation (28) follows from the fact that
∑
x p(x) log q(x) ≤
∑
x p(x) log p(x) for any two distributions, and
specifically for S(m|u) and L(m|u). Equation (29) follows from substituting Bayes’ rule, and (30) from the
definition of entropy and the identity IS(M ;U) = HS(U)−HS(U |M).
For α ∈ [0, 1], this bound is maximal when IS(M ;U) = 0 and HS(U) = logK. Therefore, in this regime
Gα[S, L] ≤ logK − αH(M), and it is easy to verify that S(u|m) = 1K and L(m|u) = P (m) attain this
bound (simply substitute these distributions in the definition of Gα). Specifically, when P (m) is uniform,
it holds that H(M) = log |M| = logK, and therefore Gα[S, L] ≤ (1 − α) logK. For α ≥ 1 it holds
that (α − 1)IS(M ;U) ≤ (α − 1) logK, and therefore Gα[S, L] ≤ α logK − αH(M). When P (m) is
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uniform, this bound becomes Gα[S, L] ≤ 0. Let φ :M→ U be a bijection, and set S(u|m) = δu,φ(m) and
L(m|u) = S(m|u) = δu,φ(m). In this case, HS(U |M) = 0 and ES [VL] = 0, following the convention that
0 log 0 = 0. Therefore, these distributions attain the bound for α ≥ 1. Putting everything together gives
G∗α = max{(1− α) logK, 0}, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 3 shows that in the basic RSA setup that corresponds to its assumptions, there is only one
critical value αc = 1, which determines the global optimum of Gα and the asymptotic tendency of the RSA
dynamics. However, when C(u) is not a constant function there could be multiple critical values αc. We
next show that in this case the first critical value α0, at which the non-informative solution L(m|u) = P (m)
looses its optimality, is α0 ≥ 1. To see this, notice that adding the utterance cost to the bound in (30) gives
Gα[S, L] ≤ (α− 1)IS(M ;U) +HS(U)− αH(M)− αES [C(U)] (31)
= (α− 1)IS(M ;U)−D[S(u)‖Qα(u)] + logZα − αH(M) (32)
where Qα(u) is the maximum entropy distribution over U with respect to C(u) defined by
Qα(u) =
e−αC(u)
Zα
, Zα =
∑
u
e−αC(u)
and D[·‖·] is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. For α ≤ 1, the first two terms in (32) are non-positive
and therefore (32) can be further bounded from above, yielding
Gα[S, L] ≤ logZα − αH(M) . (33)
It is easy to verify that this upper bound is attained by S∗α(u|m) = Qα(u) and L∗α(m|u) = P (m) (as before,
to see this substitute these distribution in Gα). In this case, S∗α(u|m) changes continuously for α ≤ α0,
even though these changes do not convey any information to the listener. In other words, in this regime,
the RSA model predicts that a pragmatic speaker will not try to convey any information to the listener
(IS(M ;U) = 0), but will rather seek the minimal deviation from random utterance production that reduces
the expected utterance cost ES [C(U)] to a tolerable degree, determined by α. This is another demonstration
of RSA’s bias toward random utterance production. Finally, we note that more generally, if the cost function
is two-positional, that is C(m,u), then it is possible that α0 < 1.
3.2 RD-RSA
Next, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of RD-RSA in the basic setup discussed in the main text. De-
note by F∗α the minimal value of Fα given α, and let S∗α and L∗α be optimal speaker and listener distributions
that attain F∗α.
Proposition 4. Let C(u) be a constant function, then the following statements hold for RD-RSA:
1. For α ∈ [0, 1),
S∗α ∈ argmin
S
IS(M ;U)
2. For α > 1,
S∗α ∈ argmax
S
IS(M ;U)
3. For α = 1, and all stationary points are optimal.
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Proof. The idea of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. Here, however, we derive a lower bound
for Fα. For this, we take similar steps as in (28)-(29) but adapt them to Fα by replacing the conditional
entropy in the first term by IS(M ;U) and changing the sign of the second term. This gives the lower bound
Fα[S, L] ≥ (1− α)IS(M ;U) + αH(M) . (34)
For α ∈ [0, 1), this lower bound is minimal when IS(M ;U) is minimal, i.e. when IS(M ;U) = 0, which
is attained by a non-informative speaker, e.g. S∗α(u|m) = 1|U| . For α > 1, this lower bound is minimal
when IS(M ;U) is maximal. Therefore, the optimum in this regime is given by argmaxS IS(M ;U). If there
exists a bijection φ : M → U that does not violate the lexicon, then S∗α(u|m) = δu,φ(m) and L∗α(m|u) =
S∗α(m|u) = δu,φ(m) attain this bound. Finally, for α = 1, any fixed point (S∗, L∗) of the RD-RSA equations
gives
ES∗ [logL∗(m|u)] = ES∗ [logS∗(m|u)] = −H∗S(M |U) , (35)
and therefore Fα[S∗, L∗] = IS∗(M ;U) +H∗S(M |U) = H(M). This means that all fixed points are equally
good in this regime. Note also that the lower bound (34) in this case becomes H(M).
4 Comparison with human behavior
In the main text we have shown that both RSA and RD-RSA produce listener distributions that are highly
correlated with the empirical human listener estimated from the experimental data of Vogel et al. (2014).
Here we supplement that evaluation with the figure below, which shows that the best RSA listener and the
best RD-RSA listener are indeed very similar to each other and to the empirically estimated human listener.
Human RSA RD-RSA
Figure 6. Left: Human listener distribution estimated from the data of Vogel et al. (2014). Middle: RSA’s listener distribution for
α = 0.9 and recursion depth 1. Right: RD-RSA’s listener distribution for α = 1.2 and recursion depth 5.
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